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IN DEFENSE OF THE REGULATION OF
INSIDER TRADING
SAUL LEVMORE*

The regulation of insider trading-transactions in the securities of a firm by persons possessing special information that is
derived from their advisory or fiduciary relationship or their
employment with the firm-has had strong support among
those who look to noneconomic values to determine the proper
role of government and the ideal content of laws in our society,
but it has had much weaker support among observers who
identify with the law-and-economics movement. In this essay, I
argue that there is little reason to think that unregulated insider trading is a good thing. These comments stress the economic dangers of insider trading and indicate, in passing, that
these dangers are related to those that underlie-but that are
also insufficiently recognized in-the case for not regulating the
behavior of managers seeking to thwart tender offers.
Part I of these comments compares the "disclose-or-abstain"
scheme, the current strategy of our federal laws for regulating
insider trading, with other schemes, including deregulation.
Part II focuses on insider trading and mergers.
I.
The starting point in assessing different strategies for dealing
with insider trading is a framework-adopted by many commentators today, but advocated by Henry Manne alone some
years ago-that recognizes both the value of information and
the importance of protecting property rights. In the settings
that raise the question of the proper regulation of insider trading, these two goods, information and property rights, are frequently forced into competition with one another. A legal
system that stressed the value of information might, for instance, encourage or force all businesses to disclose information about future plans and projects. After all, when such
information is withheld, neighbors, customers, suppliers, investors, and competitors are likely to make suboptimal decisions.
It is obvious, however, that this sort of full disclosure, while
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
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promoting efficient behavior on the part of persons and entities
affected by the actions of the disclosing business, can be harmful to the interests of the discloser. A firm that disclosed all its
future plans would find, for example, that it faced higher prices
when dealing with informed, strategic suppliers who controlled
assets of special importance to the firm's plans. Quite clearly,
the value of a firm's plans, or property in general, decreases if
the firm must reveal these plans at a time that is premature in
terms of minimizing the cost of putting such plans into effect.
Thus, it appears clear that rules requiring the disclosure of information may interfere with property rights.
The converse proposition-that full protection of property
rights may lead to too little information and to inefficient behavior-is even easier to grasp. If, for example, a firm withholds information about its plan to provide train service
between points A and B (perhaps because it fears that disclosure will cause an increase in the price of land needed for this
rail link), then other businesses may make suboptimal locational decisions (to set up in location C, for instance) that can
only be corrected at great expense once they learn about train
service between A and B.
I have pointed out elsewhere that a legal system can try to
resolve this tension and have the advantages of both full information and property right protection by requiring disclosure
while endowing firms with eminent-domain-like powers to offset the strategic responses of those with whom they deal.' Such
a scheme, however, creates different costs to the extent that
eminent domain is itself a costly and imperfect process. 2 I do
not wish to argue for such a scheme, but rather only to set in
proper perspective our current insider trading laws. The current "disclose-or- abstain" regime, requiring insiders to refrain
1. Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Tradingand the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv.
117, 126-28, 142-44 (1982).
2. A useful way to think about this point is to note that the government has more
trouble keeping its plans secret than private enterprises do, if only because the government tends to hold hearings and votes on the details of its plans, but the government is
then able to use its takings power to overcome the disadvantages of openness. Thus,
when the government plans to construct a highway, in'the absence of eminent domain
some landowners would hold out for high prices for their well-located property (and
these holdouts might even put an end to the highway plan). Similarly, the law could
require more disclosure of all businesses, in order to improve the information flow in
the economy, but then arm the disclosers with the power to condemn property (at predisclosure prices). Inasmuch as eminent domain is a less than perfect process, it is not
surprising that our legal system does not choose this path. See id. at 142-44, 152-54.
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from trading if they have an informational advantage, needs to
be contrasted not only with a "free market" regime, but also
with a "full information" scheme. Under full information rules,
there would be more disclosure, and hence more efficient decisions made by those affected by this information, than under
the present "disclose-or-abstain" rules, and there would be
much more information than in a completely unregulated,
"free-market" system. My intuition-since there are no data
measuring the costs of disclosure or nondisclosure-is that the
current "disclose-or-abstain" regime is a decent compromise
between a completely unregulated approach that would suppress valuable information, and a more regulatory approach
that would strive for full disclosure with some "private eminent
domain." Because the attacks on the current substantive rules
are mostly from the deregulation flank, I turn now to specific
efficiency-based arguments against complete deregulation.
It is useful to note first that under rules allowing insiders to
trade on inside information, information will be disclosed more
slowly than under the disclose-or-abstain rules presently in effect. After all, if insiders, who are able to decide when to disclose information about a firm's plans, can profit from trading,
when in fact they know more about the firm's future than do
outsiders to whom they will sell securities or from whom they
will purchase securities, it stands to reason that these insiders
will hold on to their advantage longer than they will if they are
not allowed to profit from the inside information. An insider
who knows that valuable mineral properties have been discovered will withhold this information, not only to give the firm
time to sign contacts before those with whom it deals know
enough to change their strategy, but also to give himself time
to trade profitably on the information.' To the extent that suppliers, customers, outside investors, and others will then be ignorant for longer periods of time, they will make more
inefficient decisions. In short, decisions made by outsiders that
are contingent in some way on information possessed by insid3. The essential point is that information about a firm's plans has a social value that
exceeds the private value to the firm. The firm will, therefore, have less interest in
encouraging its employees to disclose sooner rather than later than will the society
have in receiving this information. To the extent that the firm must worry that employees will misbehave in order to profit from bad news, see infra text preceding note 4, it
will have an incentive to discourage the withholding of information. The firm's efforts
in this regard can hardly be perfect and, in any event, need not carry over to good
news.
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ers will be made more efficiently in the present "disclose-orabstain" world than in an unregulated, free-market world.
A second reason to think that some regulation of insider
trading is better than none is apparent once one considers that
an insider can also profit from advance knowledge of a price
decrease by selling short in advance of the publication of the information. It is almost paradoxical that the moral hazard associated with this means of profiting-that an insider will actually
cause a loss so that a price decrease that he can profit from will
occur-is readily ignored by most proponents of deregulation.
After all, the argument most frequently advanced in favor of
deregulation is that insider trading offers an important and desirable incentive for those agents who run a firm to increase its
value. Presumably, agents will work hard and cleverly, and
since they will know that they have done so, they will trade successfully in the firm's securities. This ability to trade profitably
will, in turn, cause them to work harder and more cleverly. This
argument requires a belief that other possible incentives that
shareholders (and markets) might offer their agents, including
stock options, explicit bonuses, promotions, and lateral job opportunities, are not adequate substitutes for insider trading.
This claim is unpersuasive, because it appears that all the positive incentive qualities of insider trading can in fact be matched
by other tools-and these other tools, such as stock options,
are explicit and calculable by employers, or shareholders, and
are therefore preferable to insider trading. Indeed, I think it no
surprise that we do not regularly see corporations granting managers the right to trade on inside information, and attempting
through this grant to overcome the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act.

4

But if we assume for the sake of argument, as proponents of
deregulation must, that insider trading is a stimulant that cannot be equaled by compensation tools that are currently legal,
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j-77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a- 78kk (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
A popular contemporary question is whether it would be a violation of the federal securities laws if an insider traded in the employer's stock after being permitted explicitly
by his employer to trade on inside information. It has been noted that we have no
historical example of a firm forbidding (or trying to forbid) insider trading, although it
would have been possible to legislate the content of the 1934 Securities Act in this
private way. See Dooley, Enforcement ofInsider TradingRestrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1 (1980).
The point in the text is to argue that if firms' failure to contract out of the unregulated
scheme (especially before 1934) proves something then so does the modern failure to
contract out of the "disclose-or-abstain" regulatory pattern.
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then it follows that insider trading is also dangerous, because
the profit potential from a drop in security prices can motivate
poor work or behavior by insiders that is disastrous to the interests of the firm. An insider might ruin a promising research
project or overlook fraud by a subordinate simply to profit
from the later, inevitable downturn in the firm's value. It is inconsistent to insist that insiders will not behave badly in order
to profit from downturns that they know about ahead of the
market because other market forces, such as their reputational
interests, will make such negative behavior not worthwhile,
while arguing that similar market forces do not adequately reward good work.
In short, deregulation threatens the economy with less information and with strategically bad behavior by insiders. These
arguments, and the evolution toward regulation of insider trading in so many legal systems, create a strong presumption that
must be overcome by those who would deregulate. 5
II.
The second point developed in Part I, that we must worry
5. I do not mean to insist that regulation is always the norm and that deregulators
must prove their case beyond any doubt. Deregulation involves a weakening of property rights (possessed by all the owners of each firm), and I think it fair to argue that
those who would eliminate these evolved property rights bear the burden of proof,
much as we would require convincing arguments before we made shoplifting legal. The
fact that most people would explain shoplifting rules as simply "fair" to shopkeepers
hardly diminishes the strong economic arguments which suggest that virtually everyone is better off with a rule protecting property rights (and avoiding the waste of resources that would be used in guarding goods from shoplifters.)
At the symposium at which a version of this paper was presented, Judge Douglas
Ginsburg asked those who would completely deregulate insider trading a pointed and
pedagogically useful question: "Would you also allow judges or government officials to
trade on the basis of information about the way in which they know they will decide
matters (that are as yet unpublicized)?" Note that there is less of a moral hazard (at least
for judges) than in the case of corporate insiders because, while the latter might prefer
that their company do poorly (after selling short, for instance), judges could often
profit from a decision in favor of either party.
If there is a response from the deregulation camp to the question implicit within this
question, it is presumably that judges will not be better motivated to work harder or
better by the profit potential of insider trading, so that nothing is gained by such deregulation and something is lost if they will be tempted to expand their jurisdiction or the
variability of their decisions. In the case of other government officials, there is arguably
a serious moral hazard that compels us to forbid such trading. An official who makes
zoning decisions, for instance, might make inefficient decisions in order to profit from
increases in certain property values. However, this is precisely the problem with insider
trading by corporate insiders. I would be interested to know how proponents of deregulation would answer the question about "insider" trading by judges and other government employees.
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about encouraging inefficient behavior, can be made with regard to many legal questions. Consider, for example, one area
of law not very different from the regulation of insider trading
by corporate managers and directors-the regulation of "going
private" transactions in which insiders buy out public shareholders. If we can ignore both the borrowing that often distinguishes these transactions from other forms of insider trading
and the tax laws that may have motivated them, 6 it is possible
to focus on the question of whether such structural changes are
likely to be efficient (as, one presumes, most voluntary transactions are), or whether there is reason to be concerned about
inefficient transactions. The usual arguments for and against
such transactions simply extend the insider trading debate; on
the one hand, after the firm "goes private," the managers will
own all the equity in the firm, and may, therefore, work harder.
On the other hand, these managers may have waited until they
developed information that good fortune was around the corner before booting the public shareholders whose funds helped
develop this information and employ these managers in the
first place. 7 "Going private" is, after all, simply a huge trade by
insiders.
If we focus, however, on the possibility that a moral hazard
may generate inefficient behavior, a different concern about "going private" transactions materializes. Imagine a firm that is
currently selling at $10 per share. Its managers know of two
distinct plans for its future. The first involves combining with
any of three or four other firms in a related business, and the
second involves developing some research proposals that have
been worked on internally and secretly. Imagine that the first
plan would cause the firm's value to rise to $20 per share, so
that one of these three or four potential acquirers is expected
to try to acquire the firm for a price between $10 and $20, and
the second plan would cause its price to rise to $15. Even if
"going private" will cause the potential acquirers to lose interest (perhaps because they would need to give the target's managers too large a stake in the surviving enterprise), and even if
the insiders must pay a premium to go private, the insiders will
often prefer the less efficient, less valuable second plan because
6. See Levmore, The Positive Role of Tax Law in CGoporateand CapitalMarkets, 12J. CoRp.
LAw 483 (1987).
7. See R. C.ARK, CORPORATE LAW 507 (1986).
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they get 100% of its profits, while they would often have to
share the value of the outside offer with other shareholders.
Plainly, 100% of X can be worth more than less-than-100% of
an amount greater than X.8
This example prompts both a general and a specific point.
The general point is that while deregulation of merger law is a
terribly important topic for public education and law reform,
little is gained by defending insider trading that occurs around
the time of tender offers as necessary to promote efficient takeovers. It may or may not be true that the Williams Act 9 and
various state laws interfere excessively with the market for corporate control'°; target shareholders encounter coordination
problems that may be overcome only by rules and techniques
that unfortunately allow selfish target managers to ward off
those who would efficiently replace them. But these questions
and tensions need to be confronted directly, not through
claims that insider trading beneficially allows an acquirer to escape the Williams Act and accumulate sufficient numbers of
shares to take over a hostile target. As we have seen, such insider sales of stock can just as well lead to inefficient behavior.
It is even possible that insiders will favor a merger that is profitable to an acquirer but not to the target, simply as a means of
profiting from the sale of shares to the acquirer.
The specific point that is related to the idea that inside traders may prefer less efficient changes to more efficient mergers
concerns the scope of Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities Act. 1
Can an employee of an acquirer trade in the target company's
8. Imagine that the insiders own 39 of 100 outstanding shares and that these shares
trade at $10. If they can "go private" by buying the remaining 61 shares at an average
price of $12 (this example will work if they can buy up these shares at an average price
of less than $15.35), then when the value rises to $15, their overall profit will be (39 X
5) + (61 X 3) = $378. If, on the other hand, an outside acquirer will pay $16 for all
the firm's shares, the insiders will only receive 39 X 6 = $234.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
10. Disclosure and other legal obligations of the acquirer may interfere with efficient
acquisitions. On the other hand, the coordination problems experienced by dispersed
target shareholders and the advantage, which I believe normally accrues to the first
bidder in an auction where information is expensive, may call for legal rules that interfere with the first bidder's, or acquirer's, maneuvers. These matters are beyond the
scope of this discussion.
11. 17 G.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). Rule lob-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a

HeinOnline -- 11 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 107 1988

108

HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. I11

stock on the basis of inside information? Inasmuch as recent
decisions in this area have focused on the duty owed by the
trader to the company whose securities are traded, there is
every reason to think that this question will be answered in the
affirmative. The acquirer's employee would seem to violate
Rule lOb-5 only by trading in the acquirer's stock and not in
the target's stock.' 2 A moment's reflection on the moral
hazards associated with insider trading suggests, however, that
it might be useful to use the existing securities laws to bar trading by those who owe a duty to the target or to the acquirer.
After all, just as a target's insiders can profit through insider
trading by encouraging inefficient mergers (and downturns in
the target's performance in general), so too can the acquirer's
insiders profit by influencing their firm in the direction of inefficient transactions. The core problem is the ability to profit
from control over bad news or inferior mergers, and it would
seem that this can be done from either side of a merger.
CONCLUSION

I have stressed two points. First, information matters a great
deal, and there is likely to be less of it in an unregulated world
where it can be withheld with impunity. Second, we need to
think about the moral hazard of insiders' creating bad news.
The best known examples of insider trading concern mineral
discoveries and other items of good news. These examples
have skewed our thinking so that there is a tendency to overemphasize the positive effect of insider trading on security prices
and work effort, and underemphasize the moral hazard that the
potential profit from insider trading will itself be the cause of
bad news.
It is too easy these days to think of all deregulation as promoting free enterprise and all that is good. The real world is
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
12. The trader is normally held to be liable only if he or she (or a "tipper") has some
link (or "duty") to the traded company. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). An acquiring company's employee would
seem to have no duty to the target company. Although the acquhrer may not appreciate
its employee's trading in the target's stock, since this might cause a price rise that
would make the acquirer's plan more costly, the acquirer has not been thought to have
a securities-law-based claim on these facts.
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more complicated. Many things, like shoplifting and insider
trading, are illegal for good economic reasons. We must be
sure we understand the economic arguments in favor of regulation before we rush to assume that economic regulation of insider trading is generated by half-baked ideas about what is
"fair," and that the insider trading laws must all be dismantled.
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